George O. Patterson and Edna Patterson v. Max Wilcox and Ben D. Browning : Appellants\u27 Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
George O. Patterson and Edna Patterson v. Max
Wilcox and Ben D. Browning : Appellants' Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Patterson v. Wilcox, No. 9278 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3707
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and 
EDNA PATTERSON, his 
wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MAX WILCOX and 
BEN D. BROWNING, 
Defendants ~and Appellants. 
Case No. 9278 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
A reply to respondents' brief is in order to 
dispel the erroneous and inconsistent arguments 
therein set forth. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE QUIT CLAIM DEED IS CLEAR AND UNAM-
BIGUOUS AND CONVEYED OIL AND GAS TO AP-
PELLANTS. 
POINT II 
THIS CASE IS AN EQUITABLE QUIET TITLE 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE QUIT CLAIM DEED IS CLEAR AND UNAM-
BIGUOUS AND CONVEYED OIL AND GAS TO AP-
PELLANTS. 
Where do respondents choose to make their 
stand? 
In the Court's Findings of Fact, paragraph 7, 
( R. 715) the Court states: 
" ... That from the face of said unre-
corded quit claim deed itself, the use of the 
term "n1ineral rights", it was intended to 
include only minerals and ores that were to 
be treated by mills ... " 
These Findings were prepared by respondents 
at the direction of the court. The deed is not am-
biguous the Court so found in its Findings. 
Yet, respondents in their brief ·at page '36 state: 
''The Trial Court had under considera-
tion before it an "Agreement" and "Quit 
Claim Deed" which was on its face susceptible 
of more than one construction ... " 
and they continually refer in their brief to matters 
extrinsic to the deed and rules of law applicable 
to ambiguous instruments. 
The inconsistency is apparent. Respondents can 
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is manifest from the deed and on the other say that 
the deed is ambiguous and the intent must be gath-
ered from matters extrinsic to it. 
Let us again examine the fund·amentals of this 
case. Respondents assert that their grant of "all 
mineral rights" did not include oil and gas. It was 
their burden to prove that assertion. Western De-
velopment vs. Nell, 288 Pac. 2d 452 (Utah). 
We are first referred to the testimony of re-
spondent George Patterson (Tr. 13-17). Respondent 
Patterson merely testifies to the fact that the parties 
had some conversations and negotiations concern-
ing uranium claims. His testimony clearly refers 
only to the unpatented claims which were in fact 
conveyed by the deed. Nowhere does he refer to the 
minerals under the 400 acres of patented ground, 
nor does he state what he intended to convey by his 
deed. 
Furthermore, this testimony was objected to as 
violating the parol evidence rule (Tr. 14) and in-
asmuch as the court found the intent of the parties 
from the face of the deed, it is obvious that this 
evidence was not even considered by the lower court. 
Respondents also argue for and rely upon the 
"grazing lease". It is true that the validity of this 
le·ase was admitted. However, the lease was never 
offered in evidence and specifically, it was never 
offered by respondents for the purpose they now 
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claim for it, namely to show an interpretation on 
the part of all parties not to have conveyed oil and 
gas in a deed executed three and one-half years 
prior. Yet, it mysteriously became part of the Find-
ings of the Court. The Court said in substance in its 
Findings that the validity of the lease was admitted 
and that the defendants, two of whom are appellants 
herein, thereby gave an "interpretation" to the 
quit claim deed to the effect that said deed did not 
include oil and gas. Had it been properly offered, 
an objection to its admission should have been sus-
tained, particularly in view of the fact that the 
court did not find the deed ambiguous. Only if the 
deed were ambiguous and then only if it were a 
contemporaneous instrument, could this lease have 
a bearing on the intent of the parties. 16 Am Jur 
(Deeds) §175. 
"It is a general rule of construction, well 
settled by the authorities, that in order to 
ascertain the intention of the parties, separate 
deeds or instruments, executed at the same 
time in relation to the same subject matter 
between the same parties or in other words 
made as parts of substantially one transac-
tion, may be taken together and construed 
as one instrument." 
First of all, three and one-half years separate 
the execution and delivery of the quit claim deed 
from the grazing lease. 
Second, appellant Browning was not even a 
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party to the lease and there is no testimony what-
ever that he had any knowledge of its existence 
before this lawsuit was commenced. Yet, the Court 
found that by the lease he "interpreted" a deed as 
not conveying oil and gas. This is simply an unwar-
ranted assumption by the lower court. Furthermore, 
even if the lease were properly before the Court, 
it does not aid respondents. Nothing in the lease 
disparages the grant contained in the deed (See 
page 11 of appellants' brief for a discussion of the 
terms of the lease) . 
If this were an ambiguous deed (which it is 
not) and the extrinsic matters relied upon by re-
spondents properly before the court -
"All the evidence introduced was equi-
vocal in its meaning, and thus appellants have 
failed to prove by extrinsic evidence that the 
intention of the parties was other than to 
grant what is generally accepted as within the 
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POINT II 
THIS CASE IS AN EQUITABLE QUIET TITLE 
ACTION AND BOTH FACTS AND LAW MUST BE 
REVIEWED. 
In this equitable quiet title action both law 
and facts must be reviewed and the weight and 
sufficiency of the evidence determined. Reimann 
v. Baum, 203 P. 2d 387 (Utah). · 
The application of that rule to this case means 
that the quit claim deed must be construed by this 
court, its meaning found from its terms and effect 
given to each of those terms. The deed granted ''all 
mineral rights" a term which includes oil and gas 
and this term must be given effect. Clearly, appel-
lant's title to the oil and gas underlying the 400 
acres is good and valid and a new finding to that 
effect must be entered. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents have abandoned the Findings of 
the lower court. They now say the deed is suscep-
tible of more than one construction and choose to 
stand on extrinsic matters within and without the 
record to sustain their burden of proving that their 
grant of "all mineral rights" meant less than the 
clear meaning of the term. 
These extrinsic matters are vague, indefinite 
and at most equivocal in meaning. Respondents did 
not sustain their burden of proof. 
We are not thereby suggesting that a new trial 
for the purpose of adducing additional evidence 
should be granted. On the contrary, where, as here, 
the decree of the lower court is against the weight 
of the evidence, a new finding must be made by this 
court. Randall vs. Tracy-Collins Trust Company, 
305 Pac. 2d 480 (Utah). 
The quit claim deed conveyed "all mineral 
rights", including oil and gas, to appellants subject 
to respondents' ten (107o) percent royalty on metal-
liferous ores. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorney for Appellants 
1307 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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